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Abstract
This paper studies the existence of a competitive market equilibrium under asym-
metric information. There are two agents involved in the trading of the risky assets:
an “informed” trader and an “ordinary” trader. The market is competitive and the
ordinary agent can infer the insider information from the risky assets price dynamics.
The insider information is considered to be the total supply of the risky assets. The
definition of market equilibrium is based on the law of supply-demand as described by
a Rational Expectations Equilibrium of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model. We
show that equilibrium can be attained by linear dynamics of an admissible price process
of the risky assets for a given linear supply dynamics.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, financial mathematicians have been focusing on the model of asymmetric
information. Asymmetric information arises when agents in the market do not have the
same information filtration. They generally make an assumption regarding the extra infor-
mation that is accessible uniquely by the “informed trader” or the “insider trader”. This
extra information could be, for example, the future liquidation price of the risky assets.
Using the results of enlargement of filtration first developed by Jeulin (1980) and then
Jacod (1985), many papers such as those of Grorud and Pontier (1998) and Amendinger
et al (1998) focused on solving utility maximization problems in a security market where
two investors have different information levels. In these papers, the security prices are
assumed to evolve according to an exogenous diffusion. In Hillairet (2004), different types
of asymmetric information, including “initial strong”, “progressive strong” and “weak” in-
formation are studied. However, the drawback of the above models is that “ordinary” or
“uninformed” agents cannot infer the insider information.
On the other hand, in Kyle (1985) and Back (1992), the market is competitive and the
ordinary agents can obtain feedbacks from the market regarding the insider information.
There have also been several other studies, published in the economic literature, on the
impact of asymmetric information on stock price. The first such paper is the seminal paper
of Grossman-Stiglitz (1980), followed by those of Glosten-Milgrom (1985). In Biais-Rochet
(1997), we may find a very insightful survey of the literature on these areas, including
those cited above. In Grossman-Stiglitz (1980), the agents are competitive and market is
Walrasian, i.e. price equals supply and demand. The only exogenous part of this model
may come from irrational traders, often called noise traders. In Biais-Rochet (1997), the
objective is to analyse the price formation in a dynamic version of Grossman and Stiglitz
model where stochastic control techniques can be used.
In the same framework, in our paper, we consider a financial market consisting of an
“ordinary” agent, an “informed” agent and noise traders. While the ordinary agent can
only observe the price dynamics of the risky assets, the “informed” agent has also access to
the total supply of the risky assets. As in Back (1992), based on the observation of the price
dynamics of the risky assets, “the ordinary” agent can infer the additional information of the
“informed” agent. The purpose of the study is to see whether an equilibrium condition can
be attained by linear dynamics of an admissible price process of the risky assets for a given
linear supply dynamics. Like in the Grossman-Stiglitz model, the market is Walsarian, i.e.
the agents involved in the market are competitive agents.
Our studies show that the existence of linear competitive market equilibrium under
asymmetric information is directly related to the existence of solution to some associated
nonlinear equations. Indeed, the equilibrium condition can be explicitly expressed in the
form of a system of nonlinear equations. However, we may not determine whether the
associated system of nonlinear equations leads to a nonempty set of solution. We never-
theless find that in the particular case where the total supply is a Brownian motion, the
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equilibrium can be reached and we explicitly obtain the linear dynamics of an admissible
price process.
The plan of the paper is organized as follows. We define the model and the equilib-
rium condition in the second section, while in the third section, we use stochastic control
techniques and filtering theory to solve agents’ CARA optimization problem and then de-
termine their optimal trading portfolio. In the fourth and fifth sections, we express the
characterization of a potential equilibrium price and explicitly calculate the linear dynam-
ics of an admissible price process in the particular case where the total supply dynamics is
a Brownian motion.
2 The model
We consider a financial market with a risky stock and a risk-free bond. The risk-free interest
rate is assumed to be zero. We are given a standard Brownian motion, W=(Wt)t∈[0,T ] on
a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) satisfying the usual conditions. T is a
fixed time at which all transactions are liquidated.
2.1 Information and agents
There are two rational competitive traders:
• The first one is an “informed” trader (insider trader), agent I, whose information is
described by the filtration, F, as he can observe both the risky assets price S = (St)
and the total supply of the risky assets Z = (Zt). He has a Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion (CARA) with coefficient ηI > 0, i.e. his utility function is equal to
UI (v) = − exp(−ηIv).
• The second trader is an ordinary economic agent, agent O, whose information is only
given by the price observation. We denote by FO the structure of his filtration. He
also has a Constant Absolute Risk-Aversion (CARA) with coefficient ηO > 0, i.e. his
utility function is in the form : UO(v) = − exp(−ηOv).
We assume that the supply Z of the risky assets is a Gaussian process, governed by the
s.d.e:
dZt = (a(t)Zt + b(t)) dt+ γ(t)dWt, Z0 = z0 ∈ R, (2.1)
where a, b, and γ are deterministic continuous functions from [0, T ] into R.
2.2 Admissible price function
The purpose of this study is to find out whether an equilibrium condition can be attained
by linear admissible price processes of the risky assets for a given linear supply dynamics
as defined in (2.1).
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Definition 2.1 An admissible price process under (P,F) is a process in the form of :
dSt = St [(α(t)Zt + β(t)) dt+ σ(t)dWt] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T (2.2)
where α and β are deterministic continuous functions from [0, T ] into R, and σ a deter-
ministic continuous function from [0, T ] into R∗+.
We define S as the set of admissible price processes of risky assets.
The purpose is therefore to determine all set of functions (α, β, σ), i.e. admissible price
processes, satisfying an equilibrium condition.
Remark 2.1 For a given (α, β, σ), the process (Zt, ln(St))t is governed by a system of
linear stochastic differential equations, which satisfies the usual conditions leading to the
existence of a unique strong solution.
2.3 Equilibrium
Given an admissible price process S, a trading strategy for the “informed” agent (resp.
the ordinary agent) is a F (resp. FO)-predictable process X integrable with respect to S.
X = (Xt)0≤t≤T , where Xt represents here the amount invested in the stocks at time t. We
denote by A(F) (resp. A(FO)) this set of trading strategies, X = (Xt)0≤t≤T , which satisfy
the integrability criteria: ∫ T
0
|Xt|2dt <∞, P a.s. (2.3)
Each rational agent’s goal, with its own filtration, is to maximize his expected utility
from terminal wealth. We now formulate the definition of market equilibrium based on the
law of supply-demand as described by a Rational Expectation Equilibrium of the Grossman
and Stiglitz model.
Definition 2.2 A market equilibrium is a pair (Xˆ
I
, Xˆ
O
) and an element Sˆ ∈ S such that :
(i) Xˆ
I
is the solution of the insider agent’s optimization problem :
max
X∈A(F)
E
[
UI
(
vI +
∫ T
0
Xt
dSˆt
Sˆt
)]
,
where vI ∈ R is the initial capital of the insider.
(ii) Xˆ
O
is the solution of the ordinary agent’s optimization problem :
max
X∈A(FO)
E
[
UO
(
vO +
∫ T
0
Xt
dSˆt
Sˆt
)]
,
where vO ∈ R is the initial capital of the ordinary agent.
(iii) the market clearing conditions hold :
XˆIt + Xˆ
O
t = Zt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
If (XˆI , Xˆ
O
, Sˆ) is a market equilibrium, then we say that Sˆ is an equilibrium pricing rule.
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3 CARA utility maximization
In this section, we determine the optimal trading portfolio of the ordinary and insider
agents.
3.1 “Informed” agent’s optimization problem
Given an admissible price process S, the self-financed wealth process of the investor with
a trading portfolio X ∈ A(F) has a dynamics given by :
dVt = Xt
dSt
St
= Xt [α(t)Zt + β(t)] dt+Xtσ(t)dWt.
The investor with initial wealth vI and constant risk aversion ηI > 0 has to solve the
optimization problem :
JI (vI ) = sup
X∈A(F)
E [− exp (−ηIVT )] . (3.1)
We consider the related dynamic optimization problem : for all (t, v, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R,
JI (t, v, z) = sup
X∈A(F)
E [− exp (−ηIVT ) |Vt = v, Zt = z] , (3.2)
so that
JI (vI ) = JI (0, vI , zI ).
The nonlinear dynamic programming equation associated to the stochastic control problem
(3.2) is :
∂JI
∂t
(t, v, z) + sup
x∈R
LxJI (t, v, z) = 0, (3.3)
together with the terminal condition JI (T, v, z) = − exp(−ηIv). Here Lx is the second
order linear differential operator associated to the diffusion (V,Z) for the constant control
X = x :
LxJI = x[αz + β]
∂JI
∂v
+ [az + b]
∂JI
∂z
+
1
2
x2σ2
∂2JI
∂v2
+xσγ
∂2JI
∂v∂z
+
1
2
γ2
∂2JI
∂z2
.
We make the logarithm transformation:
JI (t, v, z) = − exp[−ηIv − φ(t, z)].
Then the Bellman equation (3.3) becomes:
∂φ
∂t
+ LZφ+ sup
x∈R
[
ηIx(αz + β)−
1
2
∣∣∣∣ηIxσ + γ ∂φ∂z
∣∣∣∣2
]
= 0, (3.4)
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together with the terminal condition :
φ(T, z) = 0. (3.5)
Here LZ is the second order linear operator associated to the diffusion Z :
LZφ = (az + b)∂φ
∂z
+
1
2
γ2
∂2φ
∂z2
.
The maximum in (3.4) is attained for :
xˆ(t, z) =
1
ηIσ
2
[
α(t)z + β(t)− σ(t)γ(t)∂φ
∂z
(t, z)
]
. (3.6)
Substituting into (3.4) gives :
∂φ
∂t
+ LZφ+ 12σ2
(
αz + β − σγ ∂φ
∂z
)2
− 1
2
(γ
∂φ
∂z
)2 = 0. (3.7)
This is a linear second order equation for φ. We are looking for a solution in the following
form :
φ(t, z) =
1
2
PI (t)z
2 +QI (t)z + χI (t)
where PI , QI , and χI are deterministic functions valued in R. By substituting and cancelling
quadratic terms in z, we see that (3.7) holds iff PI , QI and χI satisfy:
0 = P˙I + 2
[
a− γα
σ
]
PI +
α2
σ2
(3.8)
PI (T ) = 0,
0 = Q˙I +
[
a− γα
σ
]
QI +
β
σ2
[α− γσPI ] + bPI (3.9)
QI(T ) = 0,
0 = χ˙I +
β2
2σ2
+
[
b− γβ
σ
]
QI +
1
2
γ2PI (3.10)
χI (T ) = 0.
By solving these differential equations, we obtain:
PI (t) = exp
[
2
∫ T
t
(
a− γα
σ
)
(u)du
]
(3.11)∫ T
t
α2
σ2
(s) e[−2
R T
s (a− γασ )(u)du]ds,
QI (t) = exp
[∫ T
t
(
a− γα
σ
)
(u)du
]
(3.12)∫ T
t
[
β
σ2
(α− PIγσ) + PI b
]
(s) e[
R T
s −(a− γασ )(u)du]ds,
χI (t) =
∫ T
t
[
β2
2σ2
+ (b− aβ
σ
)QI +
1
2
γ2PI
]
(u)du. (3.13)
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The main result of this section can then be stated as follows:
Theorem 3.1 The value function for problem (3.2) is equal to:
JI (t, v, z) = − exp
(
−ηIv −
1
2
z2PI (t)−QI (t)z − χI (t)
)
,
where PI , QI and χI are expressed in (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13). Moreover, the optimal
trading portfolio for problem (3.1) is given by XˆIt = xˆI (t, Zt), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where xˆI (t, z) is
defined on [0, T ]× R by :
xˆI (t, z) = ΦI (t)z +HI (t), (3.14)
ΦI (t) =
1
ηIσ
2(t)
[α(t)− σ(t)γ(t)PI (t)] , (3.15)
HI (t) =
1
ηIσ
2(t)
[β(t)− σ(t)γ(t)QI (t)] . (3.16)
Proof. See Appendix 1. 2
3.2 Ordinary agent’s optimization problem
We now focus on the ordinary agent’s optimization problem. The idea is to decompose the
price process (St)t in its own filtration FOt . We recall that the ordinary agent do not have
access to the additional information, i.e. (Zt)0≤t≤T , the total supply of the risky assets.
However, he may obtain some feedbacks through the observations of the risky assets price
process. Given his information filtration, FO = (FOt )t∈[0,T ], which is generated by the price
process, FOt = σ(Ss, s ≤ t), we may define the following process:
{
Z˜t = E
(
Zt|FOt
)
,
Z˜0 = E [z0] ,
and
{
Γ(t) = E
[
(Zt − Z˜t)2
]
,
Γ(0) = Var(z0),
where (Z˜t)t represents the information obtained by the ordinary agent through the obser-
vations of the price process.
From Kalman Bucy filter results, Lipster and Shiryaev (2001) (Theorem 10.3) or Ok-
sendal (2003), Z˜t and Γ(t) are solution of the system of equations:
dZ˜t =
[
a(t)Z˜t + b(t)
]
dt+ 1σ(t) [σ(t)γ(t) + α(t)Γ(t)] dW
O
t ,
Γ˙(t) = 2a(t)Γ(t)− 1
σ2(t)
[γ(t)σ(t) + α(t)Γ(t)]2 + γ2(t),
Z˜0 = E [z0] , Γ(0) = Var(z0),
(3.17)
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where W
O
is a (P,FO)-Brownian motion, the so-called innovation process.
We may obtain explicitly the expression of Γ(t) by solving the Riccati equation (3.17) (see
p4-7 in Reid (1972)):
Γ(t) = Γ(0)
exp
(
− ∫ t0 [−2a(s) + 2γ(s)α(s)σ(s) ] ds)
1 + Γ(0)
∫ t
0
α2(s)
σ2(s)
exp
(
− ∫ s0 [−2a(u) + 2γ(u)α(u)σ(u) ] du) ds.
We now need to decompose the price process (St)t in its own filtration FOt . The dynamics
of an admissible price process under (P,FO) is then given by :
dSt = St
[(
α(t)Z˜t + β(t)
)
dt+ σ(t)dW
O
t
]
. (3.18)
The equivalent optimization problem for the ordinary agent with an initial wealth vO and
constant risk aversion ηO > 0 is :
JO(vO) = sup
X∈A(FO )
E [− exp (−ηOVT )] . (3.19)
We consider the related dynamic optimization problem : for all (t, v, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R,
JO(t, v, z) = sup
X∈A(FO )
E [− exp (−ηOVT )|Vt = v, Zt = z] , (3.20)
so that JO(vO) = JO(0, vO , zO).
Using the same arguments as in Theorem 3.1, we obtain the following results for ordinary
agent:
Theorem 3.2 The optimal trading portfolio for problem (3.19) is given by Xˆ
O
t = xˆO(t, Zt),
0 ≤ t ≤ T , where xˆO(t, z) is defined on [0, T ]× R by :
xˆO(t, z) = ΦO(t)z +HO(t), (3.21)
ΦO(t) =
1
ηOσ
2(t)
[α(t)− σ(t)γ(t)PO(t)] , (3.22)
HO(t) =
1
ηOσ
2(t)
[β(t)− σ(t)γ(t)QO(t)] , (3.23)
and PO and QO are expressed as:
PO(t) = exp
[
2
∫ T
t
(
a− γα
σ
)
(s)ds
]
∫ T
t
α2
σ2
(s) exp
[
−2
∫ T
s
(
a− γα
σ
)
(u)du
]
ds, (3.24)
QO(t) = exp
[∫ T
t
(
a− γα
σ
)
(s)ds
] ∫ T
t
[
β
σ2
[α− POγσ] + POb
]
(s)
exp
[
−
∫ T
s
(
a− γα
σ
)
(u)du
]
ds, (3.25)
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with
γ =
1
σ
[σγ + αΓ]. (3.26)
Remark 3.1 PO and QO satisfy
0 = P˙O + 2
[
a− γ¯α
σ
]
PO +
α2
σ2
(3.27)
PO(T ) = 0,
0 = Q˙O +
[
a− γ¯α
σ
]
QO +
β
σ2
[α− γ¯σPO ] + bPO (3.28)
QO(T ) = 0.
4 Characterization of the equilibrium price
In this section, we give a characterization of a market equilibrium as defined in Definition
2.2. Using the optimal strategy of each agent determined in the previous section, we find
that the equilibrium condition can be explicitly expressed as a nonlinear system.
Theorem 4.1 The equilibrium condition is equivalent to the following nonlinear system of
at most three equations with three unknown variables, α, β, and σ :
1
η
O
[β(t)− σ(t)γ(t)QO(t)] + 1η
I
[β(t)− σ(t)γ(t)QI (t)] = 0,
1
ηIσ2(t)
[α(t)− σ(t)γ(t)PI (t)]− 1 = 0,
[α(t)− σ(t)γ(t)PO(t)]Var(Z˜t) = 0.
(4.1)
Proof. The equilibrium pricing rule is given by
XˆI (t, Zt) + XˆO(t, Z˜t) = Zt. (4.2)
To simplify the calculations, we assume, without loss of generality, that the Gaussian process
(Zt − Z˜t, Z˜t) is centered. The equilibrium (4.2) is equivalent to
{
E[XˆI (t, Zt) + XˆO(t, Z˜t)] = E[Zt],
Var
[
XˆI (t, Zt) + XˆO(t, Z˜t)
]
= Var(Zt).
(4.3)
Using (3.14) and (3.21), the equilibrium condition becomes:
{
HO(t) +HI (t) = 0,
(ΦI (t)− 1)
(
Zt − Z˜t
)
+ (ΦO(t) + ΦI (t)− 1) Z˜t = 0.
(4.4)
Multiplying the latter by Z˜t and taking its expectation, we obtain:
(ΦI (t)− 1)E
[
(Zt − Z˜t)Z˜t
]
+ (ΦO(t) + ΦI (t)− 1)Var(Z˜t) = 0. (4.5)
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Using the the fact that
E
[
(Zt − Z˜t)Z˜t
]
= E
[
(ZtZ˜t − Z˜2t )
]
= E
[
Z˜tE[Zt|FOt ]− Z˜2t )
]
= 0,
and plugging into (4.5), we have:
(ΦI (t) + ΦO(t)− 1)Var(Z˜t) = 0.
Plugging this latter equation into the second equation of (4.4), we obtain:
(ΦI (t)− 1)
(
Zt − Z˜t
)
= 0. (4.6)
As such, the equilibrium condition becomes:
HO(t) +HI (t) = 0,
(ΦI (t)− 1) Γ(t) = 0,
(ΦI (t) + ΦO(t)− 1)Var(Z˜t) = 0.
(4.7)
Since Γ(t) > 0, the above equilibrium condition is also written as:
HO(t) +HI (t) = 0,
ΦI (t)− 1 = 0,
ΦO(t)Var(Z˜t) = 0,
(4.8)
and the required results are obtained by substituting the expression of HO ,HI , ΦO , and ΦI .
2
Remark 4.1 While the explicit expression of the equilibrium condition is in the form of a
nonlinear system, we do not know whether this system leads to a nonempty set of solution.
Recall that QO , QI , PO , PI , and γ are dependent on the unknown variables α, β, and σ,
see (3.11), (3.12), (3.24), and (3.25).
Remark 4.2 In the case of a non-degenerated model, i.e. Z˜ 6= 0, the equilibrium is
equivalent to the following system:
1
η
O
[β(t)− σ(t)γ(t)QO(t)] + 1η
I
[β(t)− σ(t)γ(t)QI (t)] = 0,
1
ηIσ2(t)
[α(t)− σ(t)γ(t)PI (t)]− 1 = 0,
α(t)− σ(t)γ(t)PO(t) = 0.
5 Equilibrium in the case: Zt = Wt
We take the particular case of Zt = Wt, i.e. a(t) = b(t) = 0 and γ(t) = 1.
Proposition 5.1 In the case of Zt =Wt, the equilibrium is reached and the linear dynamics
of an admissible price process is given by
dSt = St [α(t)Ztdt+ σ(t)dWt] . (5.9)
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with
σ(t) =
1
ηI
[
µ(t) +
1
3
µ2(t)
µT
(
1− µ
3(t)
µ3
T
)]
, (5.10)
α(t) = σ(t)µ(t), (5.11)
where
µ(t) =
µT
1 + µT (T − t)
and µT is any arbitrary positive constant.
Remark 5.3 The equilibrium condition does not depend on the
CARA coefficient of the ordinary agent. In economic sense, this means that the “informed”
agent defines his trading strategy in order to maximize his expected utility from terminal
wealth and imposes his optimal trading strategy upon the ordinary trader.
Proof of proposition 5.1. Let us set µ(t) = α(t)σ(t) . From (3.26), (3.17), and (3.27), we
obtain : 
γ(t) = 1 + µ(t)Γ(t),
Γ˙(t) = 1− [1 + µ(t)Γ(t)]2,
P˙O = −µ(t)2 + 2µ(t)[1 + µ(t)Γ(t)]PO(t).
(5.12)
While the first relation in (3.17) becomes:
dZ˜t = [1 + µ(t)Γ(t)]dW
O
t . (5.13)
Thus
Var(Z˜t) =
∫ t
0
[1 + µ(s)Γ(s)]2ds. (5.14)
The equilibrium pricing rule (4.1) becomes :
1
ηO
[β(t)− σ(t)(1 + µ(t)Γ(t))QO(t)]
+
1
ηI
[β(t)− σ(t)QI (t)] = 0, (5.15)
1
ηIσ(t)
[µ(t)− PI (t)]− 1 = 0, (5.16)
[µ(t)− (1 + µ(t)Γ(t))PO(t)] Var(Z˜t) = 0. (5.17)
The latter relation (5.17) is equivalent to, for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
µ(t)− (1 + µ(t)Γ(t))PO(t) = 0, (5.18)
or
Var(Z˜t) = 0. (5.19)
We show that the degenerated case (5.19) cannot happen. Assume that there exists t such
that the latter equation (5.19) is satisfied, then by using (5.14), we have
1 + µ(s)Γ(s) = 0, ∀ s ∈ [0, t].
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As Γs = s, we obtain:
µ(s) = −1
s
, ∀ s ∈ [0, t]. (5.20)
We recall that µ = ασ , as such, we either have lims→0 α(s) =∞ or lims→0 σ(s) = 0, leading
to a non admissible price function (see Remark 2.1).
As such, relation (5.17) is equivalent to
µ(t)− (1 + µ(t)Γ(t))PO(t) = 0, (5.21)
By deriving the latter equation, we obtain:
µ˙− (1 + µΓ)P˙O −
(
µ˙Γ + µΓ˙
)
PO = 0 (5.22)
Using the expressions of Γ˙ and P˙O in (5.12) , we obtain the following equation :
µ˙− (1 + µΓ) [−µ(t)2 + 2µ(1 + µΓ)PO]
− [µ˙Γ + µ (1− [1 + µ(t)Γ]2)]PO = 0. (5.23)
A straightforward simplification gives us:
µ˙(1− ΓPO) + µ2(1 + µ(t)Γ)− µ2POΓ(2 + µΓ)− 2µPO = 0
Using (5.21), we obtain :
µ˙(1− ΓPO)− µPO = 0. (5.24)
Using once more (5.21), we obtain the following equation for µ :
µ˙(t) = µ2(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.25)
As such,
µ(t) = µT
1
1 + µT (T − t)
(5.26)
which raises no problem of definition in the case of µT > 0.
From equation (5.15) and (5.16),we obtain the explicit expression of σ and β, and therefore
α.
σ(t) =
1
ηI
[
µ(t) +
1
3
µ2(t)
µT
(
1− µ
3(t)
µ3
T
)]
(5.27)
α(t) = σ(t)µ(t) (5.28)
β(t) = 0 (5.29)
where µ(t) =
µT
1 + µT (T − t)
. (5.30)
We check that when µT > 0, µ and σ are positive for t ∈ [0, T ]. 2
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1
We set:
φ(t, z) =
1
2
PI(t)z2 +QI (t)z + χI (t)
g(t, v, z) = −ηIv − φ(t, z)
Where PI , QI , and χI are expressed as above [see(3.11), (3.12), (3.13)]
By differentiating, we obtain:
∂g
∂t
= −∂φ
∂t
,
∂g
∂v
= −ηI ,
∂g
∂z
= −∂φ
∂z
Lxg = −ηI (αz + β)x− LZφ
By applying Itoˆ’s formula to g(t, Vt, Zt) for any X ∈ A(F) between t and T , we obtain :
g(T, VT , ZT ) = g(t, Vt, Zt) +
∫ T
t
(
∂g
∂t
+ LXug
)
(u, Vu, Zu)du
+
∫ T
t
(
∂g
∂v
Xσ + (
∂g
∂z
)γ)(u, Vu, Zu)dWu
= g(t, Vt, Zt)
+
∫ T
t
(
−∂φ
∂t
− LY φ− ηIX(αZ + β)
)
(u, Zu)du
+
∫ T
t
(
−ηIXuσ(u)− (
∂φ
∂z
)(u, Zu)γ(u)
)
dWu
= g(t, Vt, Zt)−
∫ T
t
(
∂φ
∂t
+ LY φ+ ηIXu(αZ + β)
−1
2
∣∣∣∣ηIXσ + γ ∂φ∂z
∣∣∣∣2
)
(u, Zu)du
−
∫ T
t
(
ηIXuσ(u) + (
∂φ
∂z
)(u, Zu)γ(u)
)
dWu
−1
2
∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣ηIXσ + γ ∂φ∂z
∣∣∣∣2 (u, Zu)du. (A.1)
We now consider the exponential local (P,F)-martingale for any X ∈ A(F) :
ξXt = exp
{
−
∫ T
t
(
ηIXuσ(u) + (
∂φ
∂z
)(u, Zu)γ(u)
)
dWu
−1
2
∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣ηIXσ + γ ∂φ∂z
∣∣∣∣2 (u, Zu)du.
}
.
From PDE (3.4) satisfied by φ, relation (A.1) yields for all X ∈ A(F) :
exp (g(T, Vt, ZT )) ≥ exp (g(t, Vt, Zt)) . ξ
X
T
ξXt
. (A.2)
13
Since g(T, v, z) = −ηIv and ξX is a (P,F)-supermartingale, we obtain by taking conditional
expectation in the previous inequality :
E [− exp (−ηIVT )|Vt = v, Yt = y] ≤ − exp (g(t, v, z)) ,
for all X ∈ A(F) and so :
JF(t, v, z) ≤ − exp (g(t, v, z)) . (A.3)
Consider now the control strategy Xˆt = xˆ(t, Zt), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where xˆ is defined in (3.6)
or more explicitly in (3.14). Then, we clearly have Xˆ ∈ A(F), and we have now equality in
(A.2) since xˆ attains the supremum in the PDE (3.4) :
exp (g(T, Vt, ZT )) = exp (g(t, Vt, Zt)) .
ξXˆT
ξXˆt
. (A.4)
Observe that :
ηI Xˆuσ(u) + (
∂φ
∂z
)(u, Zu)γ(u) = Zu(ηIΦ(u)σ(u) + PI (u)γ(u)) +
ηIH(u)σ(u) +QI (u)γ(u).
Since Z is a Gaussian process, it follows that for some δ > 0, we have :
E
[
exp
(
δ
∣∣∣∣ηIXuσ + γ ∂φ∂z
∣∣∣∣2 (u, Zu)
)]
< ∞.
Therefore by Liptser, Shiryaev (1977, p.220), ξXˆ is a (P,F)-martingale and so by taking
conditional expectation in (A.4), we have :
E [− exp (−ηIVT )|Vt = v, Zt = z] = − exp (g(t, v, z)) ,
for the wealth process V controlled by the trading portfolio Xˆ. This last equality combined
with (A.3) ends the proof. 2
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